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Informative Positive and Negative Campaigning
Author(s): Mattias K. Polborn;David T. Yi
Source: Journal:Quarterly Journal of Political Science ISSN Print:1554-0626, ISSN Online:1554-0634 Publisher:Now Publishers Volume 1 Number 4,
Document Type: Article Pages: 21 (351-371) DOI: 10.1561/100.00000013
Abstract: This paper develops a theoretical model of informative
campaigning, both positive and negative. We argue that some
information on a candidate can be transmitted more efficiently by
his opponents and that negative campaigning, on average,
facilitates a more informed choice by the electorate. In our
model, voters have incomplete information about candidates'
qualities. Each candidate can either lead a positive
campaign, defined as issue-focused, indicating his high quality,
or a negative campaign, defined as revealing detrimental
information about his competitor. Voters receive the information
that candidates choose to reveal and rationally update their
beliefs about the remaining issues. We derive the equilibrium
behavior of candidates in this framework and compare it to
stylized facts of negative campaigning reported in the empirical
literature.
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