Search
 New @ Now
Products
 FnTs in Business  FnTs in Technology
For Authors
 Review Updates
 Authors Advantages
 Download Style Files
 Submit an article
 

Religion and Preferences for Social Insurance



Author(s): Kenneth Scheve;David Stasavage

Source:
    Journal:Quarterly Journal of Political Science
    ISSN Print:1554-0626,  ISSN Online:1554-0634
    Publisher:Now Publishers
    Volume 1 Number 3,

Document Type: Article
Pages: 32 (255-286)
DOI: 10.1561/100.00005052

Abstract: In this paper we argue that religion and welfare state spending are substitute mechanisms that insure individuals against adverse life events. As a result, individuals who are religious are predicted to prefer lower levels of social insurance than will individuals who are secular. To the extent policy outcomes reflect individual preferences, then countries with higher levels of religiosity should have lower levels of welfare state spending. In formalizing our argument we also suggest that if benefits from religion are subject to a network externality (I derive greater pleasure from religion when others are also religious), it is possible for countries that are similar in terms of underlying conditions to exhibit multiple equilibria with respect to religion and social insurance. We empirically test our predictions using individual-level data on religiosity, individual-level data on social insurance preferences, and cross-country data on social spending outcomes. The findings are strongly supportive of our hypotheses.