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Religion and Preferences for Social Insurance
Author(s): Kenneth Scheve;David Stasavage
Source: Journal:Quarterly Journal of Political Science ISSN Print:1554-0626, ISSN Online:1554-0634 Publisher:Now Publishers Volume 1 Number 3,
Document Type: Article Pages: 32 (255-286) DOI: 10.1561/100.00005052
Abstract: In this paper we argue that religion and welfare state
spending are substitute mechanisms that insure individuals against
adverse life events. As a result, individuals who are religious
are predicted to prefer lower levels of social insurance than will
individuals who are secular. To the extent policy outcomes reflect
individual preferences, then countries with higher levels of
religiosity should have lower levels of welfare state spending. In
formalizing our argument we also suggest that if benefits from
religion are subject to a network externality (I derive greater
pleasure from religion when others are also religious), it is
possible for countries that are similar in terms of underlying
conditions to exhibit multiple equilibria with respect to religion
and social insurance. We empirically test our predictions using
individual-level data on religiosity, individual-level data on
social insurance preferences, and cross-country data on social
spending outcomes. The findings are strongly supportive of our
hypotheses.
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