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Self-Interest, Inequality, and Entitlement in Majoritarian Decision-Making
Author(s): Daniel Diermeier;Sean Gailmard
Source:
Journal:Quarterly Journal of Political Science
ISSN Print:1554-0626, ISSN Online:1554-0634
Publisher:Now Publishers
Volume 1 Number 4,
Document Type: Article
Pages: 24 (327-350)
DOI: 10.1561/100.00000015
Abstract: We experimentally test competing theories of
three-player majoritarian bargaining models with fixed, known
disagreement values. Subjects are randomly assigned to three
roles: a proposer and two types of voters. Each role is randomly
assigned a disagreement value, i.e. a given amount of money he/she
will receive if the proposal is rejected. These values are known
to all players before any decision is made. Proposers then make a
take-it-or-leave-it offer on how to split a fixed, known amount of
money among the players. If a majority of players accepts the
proposal, the players' payoffs are determined by the proposal; if
the proposal is rejected, each player receives his or her
reservation value. We assess the ability of three behavioral
hypotheses – self-interest, egalitarianism, and
inequality-aversion – to account for our results. Our primary
design variable is the proposer's reservation value, which allows
us to obtain different implications from each hypothesis. We find
that each hypothesis is inconsistent with our data in important
respects. However, subjects strongly respond to changes in
reservation values as if they were interpreted as a basic form of
entitlement.
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