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Ethical Voters and Costly Information Acquisition
Author(s): Timothy Feddersen;Alvaro Sandroni
Source:
Journal:Quarterly Journal of Political Science
ISSN Print:1554-0626, ISSN Online:1554-0634
Publisher:Now Publishers
Volume 1 Number 3,
Document Type: Article
Pages: 25 (287-311)
DOI: 10.1561/100.00000011
Abstract: Game-theoretic and statistical models have emphasized
the desirable information aggregation properties of large
elections. However, such models do not explain why voters choose
to acquire costly information. In this paper we use an ethical
voter model to endogenize the decision to acquire information. We
show that a significant fraction of the electorate will acquire
costly information. However, even with negligible costs of
acquiring information a fraction of the electorate will remain
uninformed. Moreover, we show that as the quality of information
increases information aggregation properties of election improve,
but the fraction of informed voters may decrease. This result
stands in contrast to previous models where the information
aggregation properties of elections are insensitive to changes in
the fraction informed. In addition, changes in the quality or cost
of information affect the relative likelihood that each candidate
wins the election.
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